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regional trading bloc (RTB) is a grouping of
countries in which trade between members
faces fewer restrictions (i.e., tariffs, quotas,
nontariff barriers) than trade between a member
and a nonmember. One of the most significant
recent trends in international trade has been the
increasing importance of RTBs, which have been
growing in both number and size for over a decade.1
Not all countries have followed the trend toward
regional integration, though, and relatively little
research has examined the effects of regional inte-
gration on non-integrators. This paper attempts to
fill this void by estimating the effects of several
major RTBs on the trade pattern of the largest non-
integrator, Japan.
From the perspective of Japanese trade, the two
most important RTBs are the North American and
European trading blocs, whose most recent regimes
are the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA).
NAFTA was inaugurated in 1994, bringing Mexico
into the RTB that had been in place between Canada
and the United States since 1989. The EEA includes
the 15 members of the European Union (EU) and
the four members of the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA). It was formed in 1995, although the EU and
EFTA had maintained separate RTBs of varying depth
and breadth since 1957 and 1960, respectively. 
A third bloc, the Association of South East Asian
Nations Free Trade Area (AFTA), is potentially as
important for Japan as the EEA: each bloc accounts
for around 16 percent of Japan’s trade.2 AFTA, how-
ever, has not been nearly as deep an integration
regime, so its importance for Japan is yet to be fully
realized. Frankel (1997) reports dozens of other RTBs
around the world, most of which are among small
countries. The most important of these from a
Japanese perspective are the Australia–New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
(ANZCERTA), the Mercado Comùn del Sur (Mercosur),
and the Andean Community.3
Japan has been notably reluctant to follow the
trend toward regional integration, maintaining a
multilateral approach through the World Trade
Organization (WTO), while monitoring RTBs for any
tendencies toward higher protection against non-
members (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry,
2001). Recently, though, Japan has taken a more
nuanced, “multilayered” approach designed to
extract the benefits of multilateral integration while
avoiding many of the discriminatory consequences
associated with RTBs.4As described by Eguchi (2001),
one of the main reasons for this new approach is
to establish footholds within existing RTBs to avoid
some of the discriminatory tariff treatment that
Japanese goods would face otherwise. This approach
has led to recent bilateral discussions with Singapore,
South Korea, Mexico, and Chile.
For the time being, however, Japan has bucked
the regional integration trend while its trading
partners have become increasingly regionally inte-
grated: by the late 1990s, more than 60 percent of
Japan’s total trade (imports plus exports) was with
countries that were members of the six trading
blocs described above. As a consequence, there has
been ongoing concern that Japan has been left at a
disadvantage when its firms compete within RTB
markets, and that its trade patterns have been dis-
rupted. To date, though, I have found little research
done on the extent to which RTBs have affected
1 See Frankel (1997) for excellent descriptions and histories of the
various RTBs.
2 AFTA includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand. Although a trade bloc of sorts had been in place since
1978, its coverage was extremely limited. AFTA was created in 1992
and began to be implemented in subsequent years (Frankel, 1997).
3 ANZCERTA has been in place since 1983. Mercosur was formed in
1995 and includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The
Andean Community includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela.
4 See Eguchi (2001) and Kojima (2001) for discussions of RTBs from
Japan’s perspective.
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that many of the concerns among non-integrating
Asian countries are unwarranted. 
Because this paper focuses on the effects of RTBs
on a nonmember, it is in a minority of research on
RTBs, as nearly all previous research has been from
the perspective of member countries.5 For member
countries, the trade effects are usually categorized
as trade creation (the supposed increase in trade
between members) and trade diversion (the sup-
posed decrease in imports from nonmembers). This
dichotomy has dominated the discussion of the
effects of RTBs since Viner (1950) first used it to
establish the general welfare ambiguity of RTBs for
member countries. For nonmembers, the usual
presumption has been that the reduction in exports
to RTB members would make them worse off.
The empirical analysis of the trade effects of
RTBs has advanced little beyond the Vinerian effects,
even though they were derived in a simple single-
industry partial equilibrium model. As shown by
Winters (1997), however, in a standard general
equilibrium model, an RTB affects not only a mem-
ber’s imports from nonmembers, but also its exports
to them. This aspect of RTBs is usually ignored in
empirical studies, and when it has been considered,
imports and exports are often lumped together under
the extremely suspect assumption that Vinerian
trade diversion applies to exports as well as imports.
Further, as argued by Wall (2000) and Cheng and
Wall (2001), under capital mobility an RTB will affect
not just the quantities that firms produce, but also
the countries in which production takes place. This
has obvious implications for Japan’s trade pattern
for, as shown by Head and Ries (2001) and Lipsey,
Ramstetter, and Blomström (2000), Japanese firms
that increase their manufacturing investment over-
seas also tended to increase their exports. 
The effects of RTBs on trade between members
and nonmembers discussed in the preceding para-
graphs arise even when the level of protection
toward nonmembers is unaffected by integration.
An emerging literature, though, has looked at how
joining an RTB can change levels of protection. In
Yi (2000) and Kose and Riezman (2000), if the RTB
is a free trade area—in which members set their
own tariffs—tariffs are lower after integration. On
the other hand, a customs union—in which mem-
bers have a common tariff—might lead to higher
post-integration tariffs (Kose and Riezman, 2000,
and Bandyopadhyay and Wall, 1999). 
To summarize, even assuming that capital does
not migrate in response to RTBs, it is not necessarily
true that Japanese trade with an RTB’s members will
be reduced, despite the presumed certainty of trade
diversion. Also, once you consider the mobility of
capital, it is possible that some or all RTBs have led
to increases in Japanese exports and/or imports. And
finally, the level of protection toward nonmembers
can change after integration, and the direction of
this change can depend on the type of integration
that is chosen. What this means is that the question
posed by the title of this paper is not as straightfor-
ward as would be suggested by the simple Vinerian
dichotomy. It is not possible to make reliable a priori
predictions about the signs of the effects of an RTB
on Japanese trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II briefly discusses some recent trends in
Japanese trade, particularly those regarding trade
with major RTBs. The empirical model is presented
in Section III, and Section IV presents the empiri-
cal results. Concluding remarks are presented in
Section V.
II. RECENT TRENDS IN JAPANESE
TRADE
The bilateral trade data that I use come from
the World Trade Flows dataset described in detail
by Feenstra (2000). These data are the United Nations
trade data recompiled by Statistics Canada to make
them consistent across countries and over time. This
recompiling is necessary to avoid various problems
with the original data, including discrepancies
between import and export reports, i.e., A’s reported
exports to B do not match B’s reported imports from
A. Unfortunately, because of the scale of the project,
the data are available only with long lags, meaning
that 1997 is the latest year available.
As illustrated by Figure 1, Japanese real total
trade (imports plus exports) measured in U.S. dollars
trended upward between 1986 and 1997, peaking
in 1995 at nearly 60 percent above its 1986 level.6
However, looking at total trade relative to the size
of the Japanese economy, this consistent upward
trend disappears. By 1993, total trade as a percent
of GDP had fallen to 13.5 percent, having risen to
nearly 17.5 percent in 1986 and 1990. By 1997,
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5 Exceptions include Winters (1997), Goto and Hamada (1998, 1999),
and Winters and Chang (2000). 
6 This is at market exchange rates and the U.S. consumer price index
relative to average prices for 1982-84.
Wall REVIEWthough, it had recovered and was back at a new peak
for the period of close to 18 percent.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how export and import
trends differed somewhat from each other. While
real imports and exports were both significantly
higher in 1997 than in 1986, real imports did not
rise steadily, and even fell by more than 15 percent
between 1990 and 1993. Real exports, on the other
hand, rose steadily throughout the period. Also,
despite the dip in the early 1990s, real growth in
imports between 1986 and 1997 (82 percent) easily
outstripped the growth in real exports (32 percent).
Further evidence of the trend toward imports relative
to exports is that exports as a percentage of GDP were
actually slightly lower in 1997 than in 1986, whereas
imports as a percentage of GDP were nearly one-
third higher over the same period. Greaney (2001)
notes that the increase in imports has not been due
to an opening of Japanese markets to imports, but
is related to increased imports from overseas affili-
ates of Japanese firms and importing by Japan-based
affiliates of foreign firms.7
The primary concern of this paper is the geo-
graphic allocation of Japanese trade across RTBs,
which, as shown by Figure 4, has seen some changes
in recent years.8 The most notable of these has been
the decreasing importance of the members of the
North American and European trading blocs relative
to members of AFTA. The decline in North America’s
share extended over the whole period, although
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002      27
7 She finds that “by the late 1990s, slightly over half of Japan’s imports
are…provided by Japanese affiliates abroad and approximately one
quarter of imports are purchases made by foreign affiliates in Japan.”
8 To construct these figures, trade in a given year is the total of trade
with all countries that were members of the respective blocs in 1997.
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Figure 3there is evidence that it was encouraged by regional
integration. There was a noticeable drop in the
North American bloc’s share following integration
between the United States and Canada in 1989, and
again following the addition of Mexico in 1994.
Similarly, for Japanese trade with the European bloc,
there was a notable turning point after 1992, when
the European Community deepened its integration
and renamed itself the European Union.
A disaggregation of total Japanese trade into
imports and exports, as in Figures 5 and 6, reveals
even more about the potential effects of integration
on the distribution of Japan’s trade. Most of the
decline in North America’s share of total Japanese
trade has been in its share of Japanese exports,
although its import and export shares both dropped
noticeably following the two stages of North
American integration. For post-1992 trade, European
bloc members saw their share of Japanese exports
drop more sharply than their share of Japanese
imports. Meanwhile, the shares for the members of
AFTA trended upward for both imports and exports,
although the larger increase was in the share of
Japanese exports going to these countries. In 1986,
AFTA members received less than half as much of
Japanese exports that European bloc members
received, but by 1997 they received an equal share.
In contrast, the blocs’ shares of Japanese imports
were very similar throughout the period.
Hand in hand with the trends in the geographic
components of Japan’s trade are the trends in the
mix of goods that Japan imports and exports
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI],
1998). Over the period, Japan’s imports have shifted
away from raw materials and toward manufactured
goods, particularly to parts of machinery and trans-
28 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002
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Figure 6portation equipment. Much of this shift has been
reflected in increased shares of these goods from
East Asian countries, and a decreased share from
the United States. On the export side, the share of
capital goods continued to increase as it had since
the 1970s, which can be attributed to the growing
presence of Japanese firms with production facili-
ties inside overseas markets (MITI, 1998).9 Instead
of producing all of the consumer durables that its
firms sell in these markets, Japan exported more
machines and intermediate products, assembling
the consumer durables in the markets where they
were sold (or were even exported from this new
production base). Of course, the other side of this
trend is that exports of durable consumer goods
such as automobiles decreased at the same time.
However, these changes have not had the geographic
dimension that was apparent on the imports side. 
III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Although the trends in the geographic distribu-
tion of Japan’s trade illustrated by Figures 4 through
6 are consistent with what one might expect follow-
ing the formation of RTBs, they are only suggestive.
While they suggest that Japanese trade levels have
been affected adversely by North American and
European integration, they should not be taken too
seriously, because they control for very few of the
many determinants of trade. To obtain more rigorous
estimates of the effects of RTBs on Japanese trade, I
use a gravity model, which recently has become
the workhorse of empirical studies of international
integration. 
The gravity model of international trade assumes
that the volume of bilateral trade can be estimated
as an increasing function of the sizes of the trading
economies, and a decreasing function of the geo-
graphic distance between them. In Tinbergen (1962)
and Pöyhönen (1963), the sizes of the economies
were measured simply by their national incomes,
although, since Linnemann (1966), it has been com-
mon to add their populations or per capita incomes
to the model. To control for various other factors, it
has also been standard to include dummy variables
to indicate when trading partners have colonial or
linguistic links, are contiguous, are islands, etc. (for
a survey, see Oguledo and MacPhee, 1994). For many
years, the gravity model was criticized as being ad
hoc, although recent theoretical justifications for it
have led to its wider acceptance. Recently, for exam-
ple, Deardorff (1998) showed that the gravity model
can be consistent with several standard trade models.
Gravity models have been used to examine
Japanese trade by Eaton and Tamura (1994, 1996),
who looked at differences between Japanese and
U.S. trade and direct foreign investment patterns.
Alternatively, vector autoregression methods have
been used by Ceglowski (1996), Daly (1998), and
Nadenichek (2000) to examine, respectively, the late
1980s surge in U.S. imports from Japan, the effect
of exchange rate volatility on Japanese trade, and
the Japan-U.S. trade imbalance in a real business
cycle model. Also, see Sawyer and Sprinkle (1997)
for a survey of the empirical international econ-
omics literature as it applies to Japanese trade.
The gravity model I estimate is standard,
except that, following Mátyás (1997), Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1997), and Cheng and Wall (2002), I
allow the intercept to differ across trading partners.
Specifically, I estimate 
(1)
where xijtis real exports from country i to country j
in year t, Yit and Yjt are their real GDPs, yit and yjt are
their real per capita GDPs, and Dijis the distance
between them. In addition to these gravity variables,
equation (1) also includes a vector of time dummies
Tijt; a trading-pair effect, αij, that is fixed over time;
and 30 integration dummies.
Gravity models usually include variables to cap-
ture fixed factors that are thought to affect bilateral
trade, including dummies for contiguity and a
common language, among others. In equation (1),
these factors are all subsumed into trading-pair
fixed effects. Specifically, αij=ωZ′ij, where Zij is a
vector of all of the fixed factors that make the vol-
ume of exports from i to j differ from the average,
and ω is a vector of their weights. Rather than trying
to specify all of the unknown number of these vari-
ables, which may or may not even be observable, I
simply specify their total effect as a trading-pair-
specific intercept term. Further, because αijand
δlnDijcannot be estimated separately, I estimate
their sum as a fixed effect, πij=αij+δlnDij, using a
dummy variable for each of the trading pairs. A
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9 See Abe and Zhao (2000), Kimura (2000), and Lipsey (2000) for studies
of the geographic and sectoral dimensions of Japanese direct foreign
investment.
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ever the observation is of exports from i to j and is
zero otherwise.10
Using fixed-effects estimation allows me to
capture the influence of not only distance and other
fixed variables normally specified in gravity models,
but also of any number of important factors that
may be difficult or impossible to quantify and, there-
fore, are normally excluded. As shown by Cheng
and Wall (2001, 2002), excluding these variables
(which is the same as restricting their effects to be
the same across states and countries) results in
serious estimation bias. In particular, they show
how the usual estimation methods hugely overesti-
mate the effects of RTBs on trade because they do
not properly account for the possibility that there
are factors responsible for both high levels of trade
between members and the probability that they
will join the same RTB.
Another advantage of modeling these factors
as fixed effects is that it allows me to avoid the ad
hoc measures of distance normally used, while still
controlling for the effects of distance on trade vol-
ume. Distance in gravity models is usually simply
the great circle distance between the capital cities
or the geographic centers of the two countries,
which is clearly unsatisfactory. 
The variables of most present interest are the
integration dummies. For each of the six RTBs, I
specify five dummy variables to capture each of its
effects on trade. The first three of these capture the
effects on, respectively, trade between members,
member imports from nonmembers, and member
exports to nonmembers. The other two are used to
separate out the Japan-specific effects and capture
an RTB’s effects on member imports from Japan and
on member exports to Japan. In equation (1), the
RTB dummy variables are I
b
ijt, which is equal to one
if i and j are both members of bloc b in year t; M
b
ijt,
which is equal to one when j is a member of bloc b
in year t (and i is not Japan); X
b
ijt, which is equal to
one when i is a member of bloc b in year t (and j is
not Japan); MJ
b
ijt, which is equal to one when j is a
member of bloc b in year t and i is Japan; and XJ
b
ijt,
which is equal to one when i is a member of bloc b
in year t and j is Japan.
This specification of integration dummies differs
from what is found in most of the gravity model lit-
erature in that, following Soloaga and Winters (2001),
it includes dummies to capture the effects on mem-
ber exports.11 As reviewed by Soloaga and Winters,
not only are member exports almost never consid-
ered, but many studies do not even consider the
effects of RTBs on member imports, despite the
prominence of trade diversion in any discussion of
RTBs. Further, even when studies do consider mem-
ber exports, they assume without any theoretical
basis that the RTB will have the same effect on
member exports as it will have on member imports. 
As discussed above, the theoretical literature
on the effects of RTBs on trade is rather sparse, so
there are no definitive expected signs on the inte-
gration dummies in equation (1). Vinerian trade
creation would suggest a positive sign for the effect
on intra-bloc trade θ
b
1, and Vinerian trade diversion
would suggest a negative sign for the effect on
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5 are also expected to have negative signs.
However, in a standard general equilibrium model
it is not possible to determine the signs of an RTB’s
effects on trade with nonmembers. As discussed
above, further difficulty in assigning expected
signs arises when you consider the geography of
production decisions and changes in tariff levels
following integration. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To estimate equation (1), I use bilateral trade
data from the World Trade Flows data set, GDP and
population data from the World Bank, and inflation
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Using
observations for four years (1982, 1987, 1992, and
1997) and 71 countries, I construct a balanced panel
of 3,321 trading pairs per year for a total of 13,284
observations.12
In creating the integration dummies, some judg-
ment must be made about the timing of the RTBs.
This is because the date at which an RTB is actually
implemented may not correspond to when it begins
to affect trade. Trade may be affected even before
an RTB is formally in place, as firms begin trading
30 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002
10 This is the least restrictive specification of fixed effects and follows
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Cheng and Wall (2001, 2002).
In contrast, Mátyás (1997) assumes that each country has two fixed
effects, one as an importer and one as an exporter. See Cheng and Wall
(2002) for an evaluation of the different specifications.
11 See Cheng and Wall (2001) for another multicountry study of the
effects of RTBs that estimates separate effects for member imports
and exports. In addition, Coughlin and Wall (2000) and Wall (2000)
estimate the effects of NAFTA on member-country exports. 
12 Note that I do not have observations of trade between all pairs of
these countries.
Wall REVIEWin advance of the barriers actually falling so as to
establish themselves in new markets. Also, some
RTBs, such as AFTA, are formalized well before trade
barriers begin to fall significantly, while others lead
to significant reductions in trade barriers immediately
after formal implementation. 
Keeping these problems in mind, my integration
dummies are constructed according to the descrip-
tions in Frankel (1997). An RTB is assumed to begin
having an effect when it is formally implemented
or when a country becomes a member of an existing
bloc. Note that, because of evolving names and mem-
bership, the various North American and European
regimes are collected into two meta-RTBs: the North
American bloc and the European bloc. 
Results for the least squares estimation of equa-
tion (1) are in Table 1, which provides the estimated
coefficients, the White-corrected standard errors, and
t statistics. In addition, the last column of the table
provides the percentage change in trade implied by
the point estimates of the coefficients on the integra-
tion and time dummies [100 × (e
coeff.–1)]. Because
of space considerations, I do not report the estimates
of the 3,321 trading-pair fixed effects.
The estimated coefficients on the four gravity
variables are not surprising and indicate that real
trade was positively related with the countries’ real
GDPs and negatively related with their real per capita
GDPs. Because of the perfect collinearity of the time
dummies, the dummy for 1982 was excluded, mean-
ing that the remaining time dummies indicated
changes in trade relative to 1982.
As the results in Table 1 indicate, the six RTBs
tended to have positive and statistically significant
effects on their members’ trade with each other. As
for their effects on their members’ trade with Japan
and the rest of the world, there was not nearly as
much consistency in sign or magnitude. Contrary
to trade diversion, only one of the RTBs had a signifi-
cant negative effect on imports from the rest of the
world, although their effects on exports to the rest
of the world did tend to be negative. As discussed
in more detail below, the effects of the RTBs on
members’ trade with Japan tended to differ a great
deal from their effects on members’ trade with the
rest of the world. As the present focus is Japan, the
aggregated effects of the RTBs from Japan’s perspec-
tive are provided in Table 2. These numbers are
calculated by simply taking the point estimates of
the effects of the RTBs on trade with Japan and
applying them to the actual levels of trade for 1997.
A. North American Bloc
As reported in Table 1, I find that the North
American trading bloc has had relatively large effects
on all five categories of trade, especially intra-bloc
trade, which was 57 percent higher because of the
bloc. For trade with nonmembers, the bloc’s effects
were varied, affecting the members’ trade with Japan
differently from their trade with the rest of the world.
Specifically, because of the bloc, member imports
from the rest of the world were 18 percent higher,
while member imports from Japan were 17 percent
lower. Also, member exports to the rest of the world
and to Japan were both lower because of the bloc,
although the 37 percent decrease in exports to Japan
was more than twice the effect on exports to the
rest of the world. 
As shown in Table 2, combining the negative
effects that the North American bloc had on both
directions of trade with Japan indicates that the bloc
led to a decrease in total trade of US$53 billion in
1997, or 25 percent of members’ total trade with
Japan. Because the North American bloc is by far
the most important RTB from Japan’s perspective,
this represented a significant decline in Japanese
trade with the world. Specifically, because of the
North American bloc, total Japanese exports and
imports were, respectively, 5.4 percent and 9.2 per-
cent lower, implying a 7 percent decrease in Japanese
total trade with the world.
B. European Bloc
The estimated effects of the European bloc on
trade are very different from those of the North
American bloc. First, contrary to the predictions of
Vinerian trade creation, I find that the European
bloc had virtually no effect on trade between mem-
bers. On the other hand, consistent with Vinerian
trade diversion, I find that member imports from
Japan and the rest of the world were, respectively,
36 percent and 11 percent lower because of the RTB.
Interestingly, while member exports to the rest of
the world were 22 percent lower, member exports
to Japan were 31 percent higher.
As shown in Table 2, the opposing large effects
of the European bloc on Japanese imports and
exports meant that Japan’s total trade with bloc
members in 1997 was 8.7 percent, or US$10 billion,
lower because of the bloc. In terms of Japan’s trade
with the world, the effect of the bloc was a 5.9 per-
cent decrease in exports and a 4.6 percent increase
in imports, for a decrease in total trade of 1.4 percent.
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Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Log of Real Exports)
Coefficient Robust s.e. t statistic Percentage change
Constant –5.919 1.175 –5.038
Log of real exporter GDP 1.244 0.208 5.985
Log of real importer GDP 1.554 0.201 7.723
Log of per capita exporter GDP –0.780 0.192 –4.063
Log of per capita importer GDP –1.030 0.183 –5.644
1987 dummy –0.019 0.032 –0.584 –1.8
1992 dummy –0.048 0.055 –0.868 –4.7
1997 dummy 0.045 0.075 0.603 4.6
North American bloc
Intra-bloc trade 0.448 0.138 3.243 56.6*
Imports from rest of the world 0.167 0.060 2.785 18.2*
Exports to rest of the world –0.188 0.055 –3.399 –17.2*
Imports from Japan –0.196 0.092 –2.129 –17.8*
Exports to Japan –0.454 0.213 –2.135 –36.5*
European bloc
Intra-bloc trade –0.025 0.063 –0.391 –2.4
Imports from rest of the world –0.116 0.065 –1.779 –10.9
Exports to rest of the world –0.248 0.044 –5.628 –21.9*
Imports from Japan –0.444 0.103 –4.330 –35.9*
Exports to Japan 0.273 0.111 2.460 31.4*
AFTA
Intra-bloc trade 0.322 0.135 2.387 38.0*
Imports from rest of the world 0.239 0.091 2.643 27.0*
Exports to rest of the world 0.307 0.075 4.102 35.9*
Imports from Japan 0.001 0.136 0.010 0.1
Exports to Japan –0.096 0.166 –0.582 –9.2
ANZCERTA
Intra-bloc trade 0.069 0.054 1.283 7.1
Imports from rest of the world 0.091 0.116 0.789 9.6
Exports to rest of the world 0.127 0.115 1.110 13.6
Imports from Japan –0.684 0.113 –6.057 –49.5*
Exports to Japan –0.388 0.085 –4.570 –32.1*
Mercosur
Intra-bloc trade 0.334 0.108 3.101 39.6*
Imports from rest of the world 0.770 0.103 7.458 115.9*
Exports to rest of the world –0.362 0.091 –3.966 –30.4*
Imports from Japan –0.069 0.140 –0.490 –6.6
Exports to Japan –0.381 0.214 –1.777 –31.7
Andean Community
Intra-bloc trade 0.560 0.205 2.731 75.1*
Imports from rest of the world 0.230 0.083 2.769 25.9*
Exports to rest of the world 0.048 0.111 0.436 4.9
Imports from Japan –0.520 0.214 –2.423 –40.5*
Exports to Japan –0.238 0.354 –0.672 –21.1
Number of observations 13,284, R –2= 0.898, RMSE = 0.907
NOTE: The estimates of the 3,321 fixed effects are suppressed for space considerations. Asterisks indicate a percentage effect that is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 1C. AFTA
I find that because of the formation of AFTA,
intra-bloc trade and members’ trade with the non-
Japanese world were both much higher. Intra-bloc
trade increased by 38 percent, while imports from
and exports to the rest of the world rose by 27 per-
cent and 36 percent, respectively. On the other
hand, the estimated effects of AFTA on trade with
Japan were both statistically no different from zero,
leaving Japan out of the AFTA trade boom. 
In terms of trade volume, AFTA members are
collectively as important to Japan as the members
of the European bloc. Nevertheless, by 1997, AFTA
did not have much of an effect on Japan. Clearly,
though, the jury is still out on the effects of AFTA
on Japanese trade as the relative newness and shal-
lowness of AFTA integration are likely responsible
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Aggregated Effects of Trade Blocs on Japanese Trade, 1997
Actual 1997 trade  Effect as percentage  Effect in  Effect as percentage 
(US$ billions) of trade with bloc US$ billions of trade with world
North American bloc
Japanese exports 130.6 –17.8 –23.2 –5.4
Japanese imports 80.9 –36.5 –29.5 –9.2
Total trade with Japan 211.5 –25.0 –52.8 –7.0
European bloc
Japanese exports 69.9 –35.9 –25.1 –5.9
Japanese imports 47.5 31.4 14.9 4.6
Total trade with Japan 117.4 –8.7 –10.2 –1.4
AFTA
Japanese exports 68.8 0.1 0.1 0.0
Japanese imports 48.7 –9.2 –4.5 –1.4
Total trade with Japan 117.5 –3.8 –4.4 –0.6
ANZCERTA
Japanese exports 9.5 –49.5 –4.7 –1.1
Japanese imports 13.8 –32.1 –4.4 –1.4
Total trade with Japan 23.4 –39.2 –9.2 –1.2
Mercosur
Japanese exports 4.8 –6.6 –0.3 –0.1
Japanese imports 4.0 –31.7 –1.3 –0.4
Total trade with Japan 8.7 –18.0 –1.6 –0.2
Andean Community
Japanese exports 2.4 –40.5 –1.0 –0.2
Japanese imports 1.2 –21.1 –0.2 –0.1
Total trade with Japan 3.6 –34.1 –1.2 –0.2
Total for all blocs
Japanese exports 286.0 –19.0 –54.3 –12.7
Japanese imports 196.0 –12.8 –25.0 –7.8
Total trade with Japan 482.1 –16.5 –79.3 –10.6
NOTE: The trade data in the second column are from World Trade Flows, and the numbers in the shaded areas are from the last column
of Table 1. Other numbers are the author’s calculations.
Table 2for both the small estimated effects and the large
standard errors. From a Japanese perspective, this
RTB is perhaps the most interesting for future
research, because the effects of the other two large
blocs are probably already firmly established.
D. ANZCERTA
The only significant effects that I find for the
ANZCERTA are the large decreases in member trade
with Japan. As with AFTA and NAFTA, this agreement
has been much worse for Japan than for the rest of
the world, having relatively little effect on trade
between members and the rest of the world other
than Japan. It has decreased members’ imports from
Japan by 50 percent and member exports to Japan
by 32 percent. In total, this indicated a 39 percent
drop in members’ total trade with Japan and a 1.2
percent decrease in Japan’s total trade with the world. 
E. Mercosur
The estimated effects of Mercosur are fairly
large and pronounced, even though this RTB was
formed relatively recently. I find that, because of
Mercosur, trade between members was 40 percent
higher, imports from the rest of the world were 116
percent higher, and exports to the rest of the world
were 30 percent lower. It had very little effect on its
members’ imports from Japan, although it decreased
their exports to Japan by 32 percent. Combining
these effects, members’ total trade with Japan was
18 percent lower because of Mercosur. Since mem-
bers of this RTB accounted for less than 2 percent
of Japanese trade with the world, it has not had a
large effect on Japan.
F. Andean Community
As with most of the other RTBs, the formation
of the Andean Community has led to a large increase
in trade between members and imports from the
rest of the world. Japan has not shared in this, how-
ever, as member imports from Japan were 41 percent
lower in 1997 because of the RTB. Because members
of the Andean Community’s share of Japanese
exports was less than 1 percent of the total, this RTB
has so far had little effect on Japan’s overall trade.
G. Total for All Blocs
To illustrate how regional integration as a whole
has affected Japanese trade, the bottom of Table 2
presents the aggregated effects of the six RTBs on
1997 trade. Primarily because of the large negative
effects of the two largest RTBs, the North American
and European blocs, the total effect on Japanese
exports to RTB members was a decrease of 19 per-
cent, or US$54 billion. On the imports side, the large
positive effect of the European bloc softened the
large negative effect of the North American bloc,
making the total effect in Japanese imports from
RTB members a 12.8 percent, or US$25 billion,
decrease. The combined decreases in Japanese
exports and imports meant a 16.5 percent, or US$79
billion, decrease in Japanese total trade with mem-
bers of these RTBs.
Because the members of these six RTBs
accounted for more than 60 percent of Japan’s trade,
the total effects of the RTBs were significant in
terms of their effects on total Japanese trade with
the world. Specifically, their total effects meant a
12.7 percent decrease in Japanese exports, a 7.8
percent decrease in Japanese imports, and a 10.6
percent decrease in Japanese total trade.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study is a first step in understanding the
effects of regional integration on Japan. Despite
recent trends toward regional integration, Japan, the
world’s second largest economy, has so far resisted
joining an RTB. Because more than 60 percent of
Japan’s trade is with countries that are members of
a major RTB, its reluctance may have had significant
effects on its pattern and volume of trade. Indeed, I
find that Japanese trade, especially Japanese exports,
has been reduced by the regional integration of its
trading partners. Specifically, I find that if none of
these RTBs were in place, Japan’s 1997 total trade
volume would have been nearly 11 percent higher
than it was—exports and imports would have been
almost 13 and 8 percent higher, respectively. As
noted above, there is still some uncertainty about
the eventual effects of some of the RTBs, as several
are relatively new and not nearly as deeply integrated
as the North American and European blocs. In par-
ticular, as the members of AFTA become more inte-
grated over time, its effects on Japan are likely to
become clearer and more pronounced than those
found in this study.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of my results,
though, is that the effects of the RTBs on Japan
tended to differ a great deal from their effects on
the rest of the world, almost always being much
more negative. This finding presents the most obvi-
ous direction for future research, which should
include sectoral- or industry-level analysis, with
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Wall REVIEWattention paid to the differences between interme-
diate and final goods. This is likely to be particularly
important given the high mobility of Japanese firms
and capital and the endogeneity of the production-
location decision. Also, although Head and Ries
(2001) find that Japanese exports of intermediate
goods tend to follow manufacturing investment over-
seas, for key firms this was not true. Overseas invest-
ment by large automobile assemblers such as Toyota,
Nissan, and Honda instead led to net decreases in
their exports. Similarly, Lipsey, Ramstetter, and
Blomström (2000) find differences across Japanese
industries.
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